Author (s):

Tianyi Wu

Abstract:

How do Chinese development finance institutions (DFIs) incorporate state priorities with market discipline in sovereign infrastructure lending across Africa? Existing scholarship has highlighted these institutions' dual mandate and often mapped the state–market tension onto concessional two-preferential-loan (TPL) and non-concessional lending windows. Building on emerging studies that challenge this dichotomy, this paper first conceptualizes three mechanisms in banks' decision-making – bureaucratic appraisal, financial review, and political endorsement. Second, the analysis systematically demonstrates that policy and market logics are braided across both lending windows. However, between these windows, what varies is (i) how state actors participate in decision-making and (ii) the qualitative content of market considerations. In TPLs, both bureaucratic appraisal and political endorsement dominate to align finance with policy objectives, while financial review focuses on repayment risk. In market-rate lending, financial review and profitability concerns take precedence, though policy signals persist through political endorsement rather than bureaucratic appraisal. The paper contributes by refining the analytical framework for the identification of priority constellations driving Chinese infrastructure lending in Africa. It furthers the understanding of blended state-market forces co-shaping Chinese DFIs' decision-making. The study draws process tracing of 93 infrastructure loans (2000–2023) across Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and Zambia, with 108 semi-structured interviews.

Citation:

Wu, T. (2026). Braiding state and market: bureaucratic appraisal, financial review, and political endorsement in Chinese sovereign infrastructure lending in Africa. Review of International Political Economy, 1–38.

Link:

https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2026.2648760